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Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution 
William Van Alstynet 
From 16191 to 1979, the regulation and allocation of rights ac-
cording to race has been among the most troubling uses of govern-
ment in the United States. Entrenched in the Constitution of 17872 
and sustained by the Supreme Court in 1857,3 the original uses of 
race proved to be nationally intolerable and were overthrown by the 
Civil War. The enormous alterations resulting from that War were 
partly memorialized in three amendments to the Constitution, be-
tween 1866 and 1870. These effectively overrode the still extant 
provisions from the "accommodations" of 1787. They also provided 
the new text, which, from that time to this time, has fixed the 
ground of controversy respecting regulation by race. They are, of 
course, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. 
The first of these amendments prohibits all forms of involun-
tary servitude and allows Congress an ample power to police that 
ban through federallaw. 4 The fourteenth amendment is far more 
lengthy than the thirteenth, but in its most essential parts it estab-
lishes a constitutional defmition of citizenship and forbids the states 
to abridge the incidents of national citizenship. It also forbids the 
states to deny equal protection to any person or to deprive any 
t William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1 1619 is a late, inaccurate date, symbolically selected more because it marks the original 
landing of slaves at Jamestown, Virginia, than because it marks the first uses of race in 
America. 
• The framers carefully avoided using terms such as "slavery" and "race." Nonetheless, 
several provisions in the original Constitution manifestly grant recognition to the legal exist-
ence of shivery. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (defming state populations, for purposes of 
apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes, as tlie sum of "the whole number of free 
Persons" and, "excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons"); id. § 9, cl. 1 
(forbidding Congress to prohibit "Importation of such Persons" as states choose to admit 
before 1808); id. art. N, § 2, cl. 3 (forbidding state law from altering the status of any escaping 
"Person held to Service or Labour" in another state, and requiring delivery of such persons 
on demand); id. art. V (forbidding amendment, before 1808, of the Senate representation 
formula or the importation-of-persons clause). 
• Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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person of life, liberty, or property "without due process of law," and 
it vests in Congress an ample power to enforce these protections.5 
The last-the fifteenth amendment-is more limited: it more ex-
plicitly protects the right to vote from abridgment "on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude," again concluding 
with a section vesting in Congress ample power to vindicate that 
protection. 5 The extent to which these three amendments enacted 
a color-blind restriction on the recurring temptation of government 
to regulate or allocate by race, however, was a question plainly not 
settled between 1866 and 1870. It remains unsettled even now. 
At one level, the sheer stamina of the question, despite the 
passage of a century's opportunity for its resolution, is not surpris-
ing. The texts of these amendments are sufficiently unspecific that, 
even in the aggregate, with their obvious connections with one an-
other and with the Civil War, they compel no single answer. Simi-
larly, the welter of accompanying legislative history is amenable to 
more than one reasonable perspective. That people should disagree, 
and that mutually earnest scholars do disagree, is, therefore; rather 
to be expected even at this very late date/ The materials of enlight-
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Id. amend. XIV. 
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
Id. amend. XV. 
7 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND 
THE CoNSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1083-1118 (1953); H. FLAcK, THE 
ADOPTION oF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); W. Gn.i.ETTE, THE RIGHT To VoTE (1965); 
R. HARRIS, THE QuEsT FOR EQUAUTY (1960); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FoURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1956); J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1909); H. MEYER, THE HisTORY AND MEANING OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1977); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw (1965) (originally published as THE ANTisLAVERY 
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (l!i51)); Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the 
Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385 (1966); Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1955); Frank & Munro, The 
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950); 
Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. 
REv. 479; Graha~, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954); 
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ened constitutional interpretation permit us, I think, to treat the 
Constitution as repudiating the propriety of regulating people by 
race or allocating among people by race, but they do not compel that 
conclusion. It is oddly a matter of what we might wish to make of 
it. It has always been this way. 
What is less explicable, at least to nonlawyers, is that after a 
century of periodic judicial review there is still no formal resolution 
of the question. And this seems very odd. Laws regulating on the 
basis of race were in existence before the Civil War amendments 
were adopted; many were judicially examined in litigation 
prompted by the passage of these amendments. Other laws regulat-
ing on the basis of race were enacted after ratification of all three 
amendments, and ·still others are tenaciously put forward today; 
many of these have similarly been tested in the Supreme Court.8 
One would surely suppose that, for judicial purposes at least, so old 
and so obvious an issue would long ago have been settled to provide 
us with some steady impression of the extent to which government 
may regulate or allocate by race. But it is not so. 
Rather, the Supreme Court has itself gone through two quite 
distinct rites of passage. Now-in the "minority contractors" case, 9 
Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 33. 
• For Supreme Court cases considering laws regulating by race in the generation after 
the Civil War, see, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Pace v. Alabama, 
106 U.S. 583 (1883); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). For a modem example 
of a law dictating race-based allocation, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), 
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979). 
1 Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979). It 
involves an equal protection challenge to section 103(0(2) of the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. I 1977). This casually added provision-that is, 
added and hardly discussed on the floor of the House, and not even considered in committee 
debates-provides that at least 10% of federal public works grants under the Act be expended 
for "minority business enterprises." Such enterprises are defined as businesses owned princi-
pally by "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleut." For further 
discussion of this type of plan, see text at note 91 infra. 
The constitutional question should not be influenced by the Court's recent decision 
(mis)construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(1976), as not prohibiting a one-for-one minority quota for admissions to an on-the-job train-
ing program. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Indeed, Justice Brennan 
declared for the Court: "We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry .... 
[Tjhis case does not present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. . •. The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue . . . ." Id. 
at 2726. 
Fullilove will, however, revive and challenge the four-one-four division of the Court in 
its review of a 16% racial minority minimum set-aside program at a state university medical 
school, under racially separate and unequal standards of admissions. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). There, four Justices (Brennan, White, Marshall & Black-
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before the Court this fall-it is considering still another. And what 
many had misled themselves into supposing had been the clear, best 
resolution of this matter during the last generation is on the edge 
of turning over once again. 
In the past, the consequences of admitting race-based laws as 
a proper constitutional foundation for regulating and allocating 
have been overwhelmingly dismal. Race-based laws have so gener-
ally tended to yield by-products and side effects so vastly more 
divisive and wretched than the benefits that were supposed to be 
forthcoming, moreover, that a Court originally not predisposed to 
veto racial experiments subsequently reversed itself-despite the 
popular anger and resentment that were certain to follow. Now, 
however, having virtually captured the public morality after 
twenty-five years of leadership on this question, the Supreme Court 
is being importuned to let loose of it once again. 
On the confident assurance that there are still important uses 
for race-based laws in the more perfect ordering of this society, the 
Court is invited into yet another rite of passage. The suggestion, 
which is not new but which was always a feature of even the oldest 
race-based laws, is that it is not the regulating or allocating by race 
that is wrong or too risky per se; it is, rather, who is thus regulated, 
what is thus allocated, what motivates the arrangement, and what 
time frame should be followed. 
My own view of the matter is that the Court is being asked to 
permit not racial rectification (in reviving the licitness of race as an 
explicit device of government) but racial repetition.10 I think it 
likely, moreover, that if the Court yields once again to the Lorelei, 
racism, racial spoils systems, racial competition, and racial odium 
will be fixtures of government in the United States even into the 
twenty-first century. My reasons for feeling this way are not origi-
nal. Generally, moreover, they are not shared by the majority of 
mun) found the plan compatible with the fourteenth amendment; four (Burger, Stewart, 
Rehnquist & Stevens) declined to reach the question, fmding the plan prohibited by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (1976); the ninth Justice (Powell) concluded that the particular plan was not compat-
ible with the fourteenth amendment. For discussions of the uncertainties arising from this 
case, see A Symposium: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 CAUF. L. REV. 1 
(1979); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural 
Justice?, 92 HARv. L. REv. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, A Preliminary Report on the Bakke Case, 
64 A.A.U.P. Buu.. 286 (1978); Controversy: More on the Bakke Decision, 65 ACADEME 49 
(1979). 
10 The point in using the term racial "repetition" is to stress that once the use of race 
becomes legitimate again, we shall repeat all of the problems that divided us before: solidarity 
collapses, consensus with respect to the impropriety of measuring by race dissolves, race 
becomes important once more, and all are diminished by the experience. 
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constitutional law professors who have written on this subject.11 
Even so, the sense of anxiety that what is now adrift before the 
Supreme Court deserves some added thought before it passes into 
history provides the occasion for these notes. 
I. EARLIER RITES OF PAS SAGE 
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and 
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at 
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, 
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive 
of democratic society. 
Alexander M. BickeP2 
This has been the lesson of "the great decisions" and of contem-
porary history. It is not the "holding" of a particular case; it is, as 
11 The body of literature in this area is extensive. See, e.g., B. BITI'KER, 'l'HE CASE FOR 
BLAcK REPARATIONS (1973); R. DwoRKIN, Reverse Discrimination, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
223 (1977); T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETI, CoUNTING BY RAcE (1979); N. GLA2ER, .AFFIRMATIVE 
DISCRIMINATION (1975); REvERsE DISCRIMINATION (B. Grossed. 1977); R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINAT-
ING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (1975); Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: The All-
American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 843 (1978); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admis-
sions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAUF. L. REV. 3 (1979); Blasi, Bakke as 
Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAUF. L. REV. 21 (1979); Brest, The 
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARv. L. REv. 1, 16-22 (1976); Dixon, Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAUF. L. REV. 69 
(1979); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 
(1974); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); 
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 
CoLUM. L. REv. 559 (1975); Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 
67 CAUF. L. REv. 87 (1979); Hastie, Affirmative Action in Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. 
ILL. L.F. 502; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The 
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 
(1977); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 
(1974); Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law 
Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1973); Nagel, Equal Treatment and 
Compensatory Discrimination, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 348 (1973); O'Neil, Bakke in Bal-
ance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CAUF. L. REV. 143 (1979); O'Neil, Preferential Admis-
sions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971); 
O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 
(1974); Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affirmative Action," 67 CAUF. L. REV. 
171 (1979); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment 
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 1; Ravenell, DeFunis and Bakke ••. The Voice Not 
Heard, 21 How. L.J. 128 (1978); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political 
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Sedler, Racial Preference, 
Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 329 (1977); Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 
39 U. PITT. L. REV. 285 (1977); Tribe, supra note 9. 
12 A. BICKEL, THE MoRAUTY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). 
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Alexander Bickel said, the lesson of the great decisions, a lesson it 
required nearly eighty years of temporizing for the Supreme Court 
itself to absorb. 
A. The Original Interpretation 
The flrst passage for the Court came with the immediate adju-
dication of race-related cases on the heels of the Civil War amend-
ments. With the exception of a few notable cases striking down the 
most egregious race regulations, 13 the Supreme Court adopted a 
wholly tolerant and deferential rendering of all three amendments, 
imputing to them only the most modest consequences. 14 Federal 
statutes flatly forbidding racial discrimination by commercial en-
terprises were held to 'be excessive, as acts of an unwarranted color-
blind zeal. The thirteenth amendment would not sustain them, be-
cause mere commercial refusals to deal with people on racial 
grounds were regarded by the Court as too far removed from invol-
untary servitude. The fourteenth amendment provided no basis for 
such legislation, moreover, because that amendment reached only 
the government's own denials of equal protection, not those of pri-
vate, commercial parties. The fifteenth amendment was not useful, 
of course, as it dealt solely with voting. The cases so disposing of 
this matter, decided by the Supreme Court in 1883, were ironicf:illY 
entitled The Civil Rights Cases .15 
When regulation by race was the government's own, rather than 
the practice of private parties, the Court's decisions were nearly as 
tolerant of legislative discretion as they had been of commercial 
discrimination in The Civil Rights Cases. Allocation by race was not 
per se forbidden by the Constitution, the Court held, as the consid-
eration of race might be thought by many reasonable persons as 
sometimes germane to a variety of important social concerns. Thus, 
the question was not whether politicarbodies regulated on the basis 
of race; it was the different question whether the particular regula-
•• E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (exclusion of Negroes from juries 
unconstitutional). Cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 319 (1880) (dictum) ("denial of [equal 
protection] rights, or an inability to enforce them, resulting from the Constitution or laws of 
the State" allows removal of case from state to federal court); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 
339 (1880) (denying writ of habeas corpus to judge who was under indictment and in custody 
for excluding blacks from juries). · 
u E.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (fourteenth amendment 
privileges and immunities clause reduced to a constitutional redundance). 
15 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (section 5 of 
the fourteenth amendment, creating enforcement powers of Congress, very narrowly con-
strued); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (same). 
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tion by race was constitutionally "reasonable." 
The Court's view-that the laws would be sustained if 
"reasonable"-genuflected to the wisdom of legislative bodies to 
sort out good from bad uses of race; the Court quite readily ac-
quiesced in disclaimers that the fourteenth amendment meant no 
across-the-broad foreclosure of such experiments. Regulation by 
race was not condemnable or censurable as such; only unfair, one-
sided, or unevenhanded race regulation or allocation was forbidden. 
If individuals could be equally protected, albeit racially regulated, 
then nothing in the command or ethos of the fourteenth amendment 
was deemed to deny the use of racial classification to the body of 
American politics. 
This view of the matter steadily developed between 1873 and 
the twilight of the 19th century. It was cemented in 1896 in the 
"separate-but-equal" decision of Plessy v. Ferguson. 16 The decision 
upheld a state law requiring separate passenger cars for white and 
for black riders: 17 neither was worse off than the other in the quality 
of accommodations to be furnished to each; neither was more or less 
protected than the other (rather, each was equally protected) by the 
racial regulation a legislative body deemed reasonable in the public 
interest. 
There was but one dissent that took a less measured view and 
would have imposed upon the fourteenth amendment a more cate-
gorical imperative. Less flexible than others on the Supreme Court 
at the time, Justice Harlan was prepared to read into the Civil War 
amendments what was, to be sure, neither explicitly provided by 
their terms nor compelled by their compromised legislative history. 
Proceeding from a more basic premise than that either of these 
considerations necessarily controlled the matter, Harlan put his fin-
ger on the lessons of his own contemporary history. Prior to the Civil 
War amendments, race was the basis on which status had been 
determined, worth assigned, entitlements settled, and legal rights 
measured. It had been iniquitous from the very beginning, and •it 
subsequently proved to be a disaster for the entire country. He 
believed the enactment of the Civil War amendments should there-
fore be construed by the Court as altogether disallowing it. Govern-
II 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
17 In Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), a similar statute 
survived an attack under the commerce clause, U.S. CaNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3; the Court made 
no reference to the equal protection clause. 
The Plessy majority relied in part on a pre-Civil War Massachusetts school segregation 
case, litigated under a portion of the Massachusetts Constitution bearing some resemblance 
to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 
(5 Cush.) 198 (1850). 
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ment could not determine worth, assign entitlements, or measure 
legal rights by race at all: 
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his 
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed 
by the supreme law of the land are involved. . . . 
... 'The destinies of the two races, in this country, are 
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require 
that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds 
of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law .... 
The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race 
is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our govern-
ments, National and State, of every right that inheres in civil 
freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the 
United States without regard to race. 18 
The point of emphasis here is fundamental. It is not that when race 
is used, all persons identified to each race must be as well regarded 
as all persons identified to some other race.19 The thing condemned 
is not that members of each race must be "equally" protected under 
laws distinguishing them by their race, nor that they are assigned 
entitlements unequally on the basis of race. The thing condemned, 
rather, is the assignment of entitlements by race. It is the impro-
priety of the basis of assignment, not the modicum thus assigned, 
that constitutes the government's offense: 
These notable additions to the fundamental law [the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments] were welcomed 
by the friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed 
the race line from our governmental systems. 20 · 
The Harlan opinion passed into history at the time, an artifact 
of mere dissent, discredited by the dominant view that the four-
teenth amendment had not withdrawn from legislative bodies a 
political license to regulate by race. The outcome of the case was 
taken quite seriously, moreover, as legislatures enacted an ever-
18 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). Harlan had similarly dissented in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-62 (1883) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1908) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. ofEduc., 175 U.S. 528 
(1899) (Harlan, J.). See generally Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional 
Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957). 
11 See O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 
54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 19, 34-38 (1979). 
20 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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enlarging sprawl of race-based laws.21 Indeed, a half-century later, 
the dominant legislative response to Brown v. Board of Education22 
was one of fury, precisely on this account. For however the Court 
might phrase the apologetics of that decision, 23 the message as it 
appeared from the outside was that what was not previously under-
stood to be unconstitutional was now accused of being unconstitu-
tional after all: the use of race to allocate-albeit equally-those 
facilities deemed most appropriate for persons of that race. 
B. The Second Rite of Passage 
In the swift consecutive series of per curiam decisions issued by 
the Supreme Court during the two years following Brown, the Court 
made no further use whatever-indeed, it made no inquiry-as to 
whether the particular race regulation disadvantaged some more 
than others. Neither did it ask whether the law stigmatized some 
more than others, or whether the law was enacted by whites and 
opposed by blacks, enacted by consent of some of each and opposed 
by many of each, or whatever.24 Rather, that line of per curiam 
decisions appeared more completely to enact Harlan's view that the 
Civil War amendments altogether "removed the race line from our 
governmental systems." , 
Between 1955 and 1976, moreover, virtually every other race-
related decision by the Supreme Court appeared to convey this 
same message. To the reasonably discerning, this appeared true 
even in instances involving highly controversial judicial decrees that 
21 See generally C. WoODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974). See also 
Westin, supra note 18, at 706 & n.324. 
22 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
23 See D. BELL, RAcE, RACISM AND AMERicAN LAw 452 (1973); Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-33 (1959). 
24 The particular case overruling Plessy (sub silentio) was itself without an explanatory 
opinion, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff'g per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 
1956). One district court interpreted certain dicta in Brown as not disallowing per se 
governmentally directed, racially separated schools, Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. 
ofEduc., 220 F. Supp. 667, 677-78 (S.D. Ga. 1963), but was speedily rebuffed on appeal, 333 
F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). Alternative interpretations of Brown 
are, of course, numerous. For one listing, see H. HoRoWITZ & K. KARsT, LAw, LAWYERS 
AND SociAL CHANGE 203 (1969). For additional post-Brown decisions summarily dispatching 
other segregation laws, see, for example, State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 
(1959), aff'g per curiam 1!38 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (athletic contests); Holmes v. City 
of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (municipal 
golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff'g per curiam 220 
F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); cases cited in W. LoCKHART, 
Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
840 nn.a & b (3d ed. 1970). 
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paired racially identifiable schools, redrafted attendance lines, or 
mandated busing. In each instance, the fulcrum ofjudicialleverage 
was an existing governmental race line, which the particular judicial 
order sought to remove.25 The object was thus to disestablish par-
ticular, existing uses of race, not to establish new ones. Indeed, 
decrees that would subsequently presume to require race-conscious 
decisions for any other purpose, for example, to maintain 
"proportions" or "balances" by race designation, were swiftly re-
versed.26 
This second rite of passage was accompanied by consistent de-
velopments in the 1960s in the Supreme Court and then, encourag-
ingly, in Congress and the executive branch as well. For the Court's 
part, long dormant Reconstruction statutes were revived and given 
a reinvigorated and uniformly race-blind application. An early act 
of Congress had provided that all citizens shall have "the same" 
right as white citizens to acquire and to hold real and personal 
property.27 It was applied to disallow race-based refusals to deal in 
real estate, even in the private sector. 28 A related Reconstruction act 
provided that all persons shall have "the same" right as white citi-
zens to make contracts.29 It was similarly read to disallow race-based 
refusals to contract.30 In 1976, when a commercial employer treated 
an employee worse than another because of his race (this time the 
less favored employee was white and the more favored black), the 
Court held to the same view: "[T]he Act was meant, by its broad 
terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of 
contracts against, or in favor of, any race. " 31 
Similarly, in adopting the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Congress appeared to regard the matter likewise: the race line was 
to be removed altogether. Title VI of that Act, applicable to all 
•• See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also 
'Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 
99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979). 
21 E.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). See also Dayton 
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); 
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
" Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)). 
28 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
21 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1976)). 
30 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 
454, 459-60 (1975) (dictum). 
31 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976) (emphasis added). 
But cf. id., at 280 n.8 ("Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged here were any part of 
an affirmative action program . . . and we emphasize that we do not consider here the 
permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted."). 
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programs receiving federal financial assistance, states: "No person 
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance. "32 And Title Vll, applicable 
to all large-scale employers, provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 33 
Addressing the meaning of this provision in 1971, in the first case 
to come before it for review, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by 
Chief Justice Burger, said that "[d]iscriminatory preference for 
any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress 
has proscribed. " 34 
Conformably, the executive branch of the national government 
appeared to understand matters in the same fashion. For in cutting 
and revising an Executive Order that regulatEd enterprises doing 
business with the federal government, the President framed the 
Order itself precisely and exclusively in terms of strict nondiscrimi-
nation. Federal contractors were advised to review their practices to 
determine whether, if even by neglect, racial discrimination figured 
in their businesses; if it did, the contractors would have to take 
affirmative action-to eliminate that racial discrimination and to 
insure that no racial favoritism was built into their operations. 
Thus, the revised Executive Order required the insertion of the 
following provision in most government contracts: 
32 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (emphasis 
added). Compare the several differing interpretations provided in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
33 Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) 
(emphasis added). This, of course, is simply what Congress said. Compare United Steelwork-
ers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2724-30 (1979) (Brennan, J.) with id. at 2734-35 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) and id. at 2736-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
3
• Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added). And reiterating 
that view in 1976, the Court declared: "We •.. hold today that Title VII prohibits racial 
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would 
be applicable were they Negroes .... " McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 
273, 280 (1976) (emphasis added). But see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 
(1979). 
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The contractor will not discriminate against any employee 
or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during employment without regard to their 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.35 
In light of these several developments, it should have come as 
no surprise that in 1974, in the first case that came before the 
Supreme Court involving race lines deliberately drawn to place a 
racial disadvantage on white applicants-drawn out of fear that if 
no such disadvantage were imposed upon them, then fewer non-
white individuals might be admitted than the faculty of a state 
university preferred to have-the one Justice of the Supreme Court 
who addressed the merits of the case said this: , 
A DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason 
of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter what 
his race or color. . . . 
. . . The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimina-
tion of racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our 
theory as to how society ought to be organized. . . . 
. . . So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored pref-
erence to one race over another . . . is in my view "invidious" 
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.36 
Justice Douglas then directly addressed the law school's contention 
that the race-preferential admission of some students would be a 
salutary way of producing a larger complement of such racially iden-
tifiable professionals more likely to practice in racially identifiable 
communities. He rejected the propriety of the very idea underlying 
that contention: "The purpose of the University of Washington can-
not be to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, 
Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish .... That is the 
point at the heart of all our school desegregation cases."37 And nei-
ther was Justice Douglas persuaded that the deliberate selection of 
30 Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340-41 (1964-1965 Compilation), as 
amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684, 685-86 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 1233 (1976) (emphasis added). This, too, is simply what the 
President said. Compare id. with 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1969). 
31 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 337, 342, 343-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
31 Id. at 342-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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students by race, to produce a given cohort of racially identified 
students known to have been admitted with less excellent qualifica-
tions than the balance of the students, was by any means the ges-
ture of generosity it purported to be. A segregated admissions pro-
cess that seeks certain minimum proportions of racial cohorts, he 
said, "creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segre-
gated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despite 
its contrary intentions. "38 
The refusal to permit rationing of opportunity according to the 
fortuity of racial proportion was not a novelty invented by Justice 
Douglas. In 1949, the Supreme Court had reviewed a case arising in 
u !d. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell, J.): "[P]referential programs may only reinforce common 
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protec-
tion based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth." 
Not all race-specific "preferential" government-utilized plans involve separate and lower 
standards of selection. Some (as illustrated by the Bakke case itself) plainly do. And these 
plans unquestionably impose a racial stigma on those who benefit by them, for reasons that 
cannot be avoided by the beneficiaries. This may be a cost that others would regard as utterly 
trivial when weighed against the benefits and overall good of such arrangements. Others may 
also say that this is a matter they do not wish to judge-that whether there is a stigmatizing 
effect and whether it renders such a plan undesirable is emphatically not for them to say. 
Such persons might feel that it is, rather, a matter to be determined by those eligible for the 
plan-and that these persons will show, by their participation, that they overwhelmingly 
regard the very material benefits, with whatever stigma may attach, to be vastly superior to 
the status quo ante. But the stigma is spread to others identified only by race, who are 
helpless to avoid it. Indeed, it will have been the government itself that fastened the stigma 
upon them, a new badge of implied inferiority, assigned as an incident of governmental 
noblesse oblige. 
Explicit in state, local, or federal plans using separate and lower standards by race is a 
statement by government that certain persons identified by race are in fact being placed in 
positions they may be presumed not likely to hold but for their race (because they are 
presumed to be unable to meet standards the government itself otherwise requires to be met). 
The message from government is written very large when these plans proliferate: a double 
(and softer) standard for admission, a double (and softer) standard for hiring, a double (and 
softer) standard for promotion, a double (and softer) standard for competitive bidding, and 
so on. Without question, this is a systematic racial tagging by government-a communica-
tion to others that the race of the individual they deal with bespeaks a race-related probabil-
ity, created solely by the government itself, of lesser qualification than others holding equiva-
lent positions. 
With respect to some such persons, the supposition will be true, according to the govern-
ment's own usual standards of "qualifications." With respect to others of the same race, the 
proposition will be false; but outsiders dealing with them will not know it is false unless 
"affll'mative action" beneficiaries are specially to be labelled as such-surely an unthinkable 
practice-and will, solely because of the government's own practice, be encouraged to subject 
them to a racial stereotype. In brief, the government's entrenched practices impose a label 
of inferior excellence that the government itself declares to be true of some persons; simulta-
neously, the government fastens a racial stereotype on all other persons of the same race 
holding similar positions, irrespective of their actual excellence. Whether this is unconstitu-
tional remains to be seen. That it is not "stigmatizing" seems implausible. 
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California where public policy had already forbidden racial discrim-
ination in private employment.39 A racial group nonetheless brought 
economic pressure to bear upon an employer to disregard that policy 
and to hire employees "not on fitness for the work nor· on an equal 
right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market, but, 
rather, on membership in a particular race."40 The state supreme 
court granted an injunction to forbid picketing meant to induce 
racial hiring in proportion to the racial identification of customers. 
The court had observed: "If petitioners were upheld in their demand 
then other races, white, yellow, brown and red, would have equal 
rights to demand discriminatory hiring on a racial basis."41 But the 
state supreme court said "it was just such a situation-an arbitrary 
discrimination upon the basis of race and color alone, rather than a 
choice based solely upon individual qualification for the work to be 
done-which we condemned"42 in disallowing racial discrimination 
by employers in the first place. The Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed the state court decision. 43 
Even when the sole use of race by government was to suggest 
that race is at least an important political datum-the government 
itself not presuming to say of what kind of significance-the Su-
preme Court dissallowed the mere encouragement to be "race con-
scious." A case that expresses that view as well as any other case 
was Anderson v. Martin, 44 decided succinctly and unanimously in 
1964.45 The case involved a state statute that facilitated voter infor-
mation respecting the racial identification of each candidate for 
local public office-by designating each candidate's race on each 
ballot, accurately and truthfully. Voters who might think that 
datum germane (as a white person to vote white, a black to vote 
black, a white to vote black, a black to vote white-as each might 
see a different, but steadfast significance in the idea) could hardly 
be kept from using it even in the absence of such specific ballot 
information. As the ballot designation by state law was nonetheless 
31 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). The earlier California case establishing 
the policy of nondiscrimination was James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 
(1944), recently extended and applied in Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 
24 Cal. 3d 458, 480-85, 595 P.2d 592, 606-09, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 28-31 (1979). 
•• H~ghes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198 P.2d 885, 889 (1948), aff'd, 339 U.S. 
460 (1950) . 
., Id. 
42 Id. 
•
3 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). 
u 375 u.s. 399 (1964). 
•• Compare id. with United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (redistricting to 
favor Hispanics held permissible). 
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thought objectionable, it could not have been because any candi-
date was exempt from it, since all were equally subject to it. It must 
have been, rather, that each was being individually disadvantaged 
insofar as the state thought it appropriate to encourage voters to 
attribute at least some significance to every candidate's race-and 
that the morality of the Civil War amendments was opposed to the 
very idea of such encouragement. And this, indeed, was the founda-
tion of the decision in Anderson v. Martin: not that a black candi-
date in particular might be victimized insofar as the state's "truth 
in candidacy" statute would gratuitously stimulate white bloc 
votes, but that the state could not thus encourage such racial disad-
vantaging of anyone, white or black. 
[B]y placing a racial label on a candidate at the most crucial 
stage in the electoral process-the instant before the vote is 
cast-the State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice 
may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of 
race and for another. This is true because by directing the 
citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color, 
the State indicates that a candidate's race or color is an impor-
tant-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's 
choice: which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his 
ballot along racial lines. Hence in a State or voting district 
where Negroes predominate, that race is likely to be favored by 
a racial designation on the ballot, while in those communities 
where other races are in the majority, they may be preferred. 
The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of 
the power of the State behind a racial classification that in-
duces racial prejudice at the polls . 
. . . We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the race 
of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office.46 
Race has "no relevance"? That could not have been the Court's 
literal understanding, as the Court knew that vast numbers of peo-
ple regarded the race of political candidates as being not merely 
"relevant" but conclusive. Rather, its meaning was that race has 
"no proper relevance" for the state. The connection with the original 
Harlan dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson seems self-evident: "[T ]he 
Constitution of the United States," he had declared, "does not, I 
think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled 
" 375 U.S. at 402-03 (emphasis added). 
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to be protected in the enjoyment [of civil rights, common to all 
citizens]."47 The state may neither use race in its own business nor 
may it encourage others to take it into account. Both are equally 
divisive and equally wrong. 
Following almost at once on Anderson v. Martin, moreover, the 
Supreme Court had cemented its· judgment that the fourteenth 
amendment foreclosed government from encouraging-much less 
compelling-individuals to treat some better than they treated oth-
ers because of race. It did so in Reitman v. Mulkey.48 In that 
case, the Court struck down a provision in a state constitution 
establishing the absolute right of each real property owner to sell or 
lease his property as he might personally, "in his own absolute 
discretion,"49 choose. As thus enshrined in the California Constitu-
tion, the personal right to consider the race of others was equally as 
available to a developer preferentially selling or leasing to blacks 
as to a developer preferentially selling or leasing to whites. 
It was -equally available as well to one desiring to use race to develop 
and to maintain an integrated racial balance in a given group of 
apartments. It was also available to black owners who wished not 
to deal with whites at all but who were resolved to reserve disposi-
tion of their property for persons of other races whom they might 
think to be more deserving-as it was available for every other ima-
ginable permutation of racial dealing. But the strict indifference 
of the state constitutional privilege-its perfect governmental "neu-
trality" toward all racially predisposed private landowners-failed 
to save it under the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the California 
and United States Supreme Courts both held it to be a constitu-
tional wrong for a state to encourage persons to act on racial grounds 
at all: 
The right. to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the 
State. The California Supreme Court believes that the section 
[of the state constitution guaranteeing that right] will signifi-
cantly encourage and involve the State in private discrimina-
tions. We have been presented with no persuasive considera-
tions indicating that these judgments should be overturned. 50 
In this twenty-year pattern of development, from 1954 to 1974, 
the Supreme Court's unambiguous "lesson" thus seemed to be that 
•1 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J ., dissenting) (emphasis added) . 
.. 387 u.s. 369 (1967). 
" CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 26 (adopted 1964, repealed 1974). 
•• 387 U.S. at 381. 
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race was indeed constitutionally withdrawn from the incorrigible 
temptations of governmental use. The commitment was sufficiently 
strong, moreover, that the Court departed from its usual practice 
and struck down even surreptitious attempts by government to reg-
ulate or to allocate by race-though of course only when it was 
within the capacity of the judiciary to detect the matter. 51 The 
resolve to do so, despite the obvious difficulties, was a very old one. 
Even prior to Plessy v. Ferguson, furtive efforts by government to 
employ race impermissibly had been overturned by the Supreme 
Court.52 The Court had readily recognized that any "irrebuttable 
presumption" of legislative good faith in these matters would be a 
disaster: the proclivity for race favoritism is so persistent that, un-
less the Court examined outside evidence that that proclivity did in 
fact account for the government's actions, the government would be 
encouraged to pursue its racial preferences in simple disguise. Thus, 
the Civil War amendments were held to nullify "sophisticated as 
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."53 As a conse-
quence, if the metes and bounds of a municipal boundary were 
modified to enact the legislature's racial preferences, they would not 
stand.54 And if ostensibly appropriate government employment 
standards could be shown to have been adopted because their appli-
cation across-the-board would screen out larger numbers of racially 
identifiable persons than the lawmakers desired to have from that 
race in their work force, the employment standard would be ex-
punged.55 
51 The awkwardness of this judicial superintendence is plainly very great. See Ely, 
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
The ascertainability of racial purpose in legislative proceedings is much more elusive than in 
adjudicative proceedings. An employer or administrative agent may be closely examined in 
court with some realistic hope of determining whether a decision that has on its face nothing 
to do with race was made because it was expected (and desired) to produce differential effects 
by race. But members of Congress are shielded by the speech and debate clause, U.S. CoNST. 
art. I, § 6, cl. 1, from any such examination, and ordinarily it is impractical to attempt to 
secure confrontation in court of other legislators~ For the most recent case illustrating the 
protective scope of the clause, see United States v. Helstoski, 99 S. Ct. 2432 (1979). Indeed, 
for one brief moment the Court appeared to despair of permitting evidence to be admitted 
for the purpose of establishing that a legislative decision, nonracial on its face, was nonethe-
less taken precisely because it would produce racially differential effects. See Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-
86 (1968). 
52 E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
53 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). 
~ Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
55 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976) (dictum). Cf. Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (zoning for the purpose 
of discriminating against blacks forbidden). 
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Thus the lesson of the great decisions is, as Bickel said, not 
merely that regulation and allocation by race are wrong. Rather, the 
message is commendably even stronger. Laws that divide and index 
people to measure their civil·rights by race are unconstitutional. 
Laws that encourage others to do so are similarly invalid. And laws 
attempting to advance either policy even in disguise will likewise be 
struck down whenever it is within the capacity of conscientious 
courts to see beneath their cellophane wrappers.56 
IT. OF TELEOLOGY AND DEONTOLOGY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
FLIMFLAMMING THE SUPREME COURT 
Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a 
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox 
is gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded are to 
be more equal than others. Having found support in the Consti-
tution for equality, they now claim support for inequality under 
the same Constitution. 
Alexander M. Bickel57 
If discrimination based on race is constitutionally permis-
sible when those who hold the reins can come up with "compel-
ling" reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees ac-
quire an accordionlike quality. 
Justice William 0. Douglas58 
It seems trite but necessary to say that . . . our Constitu-
tion was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these 
beginnings. 
Justice Robert H. Jackson59 
At the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, the question before the Su-
preme Court in school segregation cases was whether state statutes 
requiring racially separate schools were constitutionally impermissi-
ble. For Justice Harlan, as we·have seen, the question was easily 
•• The phrase is derived from the uncharacteristically aggressive dissent by ,Justice 
Frankfurter in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
51 A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 133. 
•• DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
•• West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). While Barnette 
was a freedom of expression case, the principle enunciated by Justice Jackson seems applica-
ble in this context as well. See id. at 638: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. . . • 
[T]hey depend on the outcome of no elections. 
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answered. He insisted that the Civil War amendments had removed 
the race line as a basis of governmental action, and as the arrange-
ment at issue-segregation-indubitably rested on the race line, it 
was constitutionally condemned. For the other Justices, however, as 
we have also seen, the question was by no means as readily an-
swered. They did not suppose that the Civil War amendments had 
removed the race line as a predicate for governmental regulation or 
allocation; they asked, rather, whether the particular use of the race 
line was "reasonable." And, as we know, they concluded that it was. 
Others, troubled by the frequency with which race lines were 
used deleteriously, have thought that the proper perspective is 
somewhere in between.80 They would construe the Civil War amend-
ments as evincing at least a rebuttable constitutional skepticism 
about the use of racial classifications. Thus, it has been suggested 
that the appropriate judicial attitude is one similar to that assumed 
with respect to prior restraints on speech:81 laws utilizing the race 
line should be subject to a rebuttable presumption of unconstitu-
tionality and nothing less than a compelling, or at least a very 
substantial, articulated public purpose should suffice to sustain 
them.82 Despite Alexander Bickel's own notions respecting the les-
son of the "great decisions," most who work with this subject think 
that, in fact, this is a more accurate description of the Supreme 
Court's current position. 83 
Suppose, however, we were to assume that this very formula-
tion had itself been established and popularized prior to the date of 
Plessy v. Ferguson. 84 In that event, given the formulation of the 
" There is, however, very considerable disagreement respecting the proper perspective 
on "in between." See authorities cited note 11 supra. 
11 E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity."). The utility of the comparison is reviewed in O'Fallon, supra note 19, at 
44-46. 
n See authorities cited note 11 supra. The "test" dates from Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). It is full of irony. The Court, having erected this "protective" 
test, proceeded to apply it to the facts of the case and concluded that it was satisfied; in other 
words, the government met its burden of extraordinary justification. It turned out, however, 
that the government was pathetically mistaken in what it did. See E. RosTOW, The Japanese 
American Cases-A Disaster, in THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962). Korematsu is signifi-
cant additionally: it is the last case to sustain an explicit governmental race regulation as 
applied to the facts. It is now thirty-five years later and the "test" has not appreciated in 
value with the passage of time. 
13 See authorities cited note 11 supra. See also Regents or"the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 269-320 (1978) (Powell, J.); id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Black-
mun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Posner, The Bakke Case 
and the Future of "Affirmative Action," supra note 11, at 173-74. 
u The discussion in this section is a more developed statement of views touched on in 
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question presented above, what would the Court's decision have 
been in our hypothetical Plessy v. Ferguson school case? Two ap-
proaches are possible. The first would interpret the Civil War 
amendments as requiring that laws using race lines not only be well 
connected to substantial (or even "compelling") public purposes, 
but that such purposes themselves be "articulated" on the face of 
the law in question.65 Unless the legislature providing for racially 
separate schools declared such a purpose, then, the law must, a 
fortiori, be held invalid. But if, on the other hand, an articulated 
purpose is not required, then we are not yet in a position to deter-
mine whether the law using a race line overcomes the rebuttable 
presumption of unconstitutionality. Assuming that such a law must 
indeed be well connected to some very substantial public purpose, 
albeit the purpose need not be stated on the face of the law, it 
remains to be seen whether those called upon to explain the law will 
carry their burden of justification in court. If, but only if, the partic-
ular race line can be shown by them to be well connected with a very 
substantial public purpose is it to be sustained. 
Under either view-that· the law must on its face articulate the 
compelling public good it serves, or that those with the burden of 
justifying it must demonstrate its well-fitted connection with such 
an imperative public good-we may suspect that we already know 
the outcome of Plessy v. Ferguson: namely, that the law will most 
certainly be held'invalid. But this conclusion may be incorrect; we 
must have supposed that no compelling public good can be well 
connected with such a law. Alternatively, we must have supposed 
that even if such a public purpose could (as an exercise in theory or 
imagination) be so connected, nevertheless it was not in fact con-
nected with that law. Neither is necessarily correct. To act categori-
Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 292-94, and Controversy: More on the Bakke Decision, supra 
note 9, at 57-59. 
" It is not quite clear from some suggesting this test whether· the suitably justifying 
purpose(s) must be "articulated" on the face of the law, or whether a subsequent, credible 
"articulation" in court will do; for the moment, it is evidently the latter. See, e.g., Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Hampton v. Mow 
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,.103 (1976) ("When the Federal Government asserts an overriding 
national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis 
for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest."). See also Califano 
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 n.7 '(1976). For a discussion of why this should influence the standard 
of judicial review, see Christie, A Model of Judicial Review of Legislation, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1306 (1975). 
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cally on such suppositions is not to abide by the constitutional 
standard hypothetically formulated and popularized. Rather, it is 
to act on a flat, per se rule, albeit of a rather limited kind, that "no 
law requiring racially separate schools is constitutional." But this, 
of course, our more sensitive, less dogmatic, and more judicious 
standard of constitutional review forbids-although, in fact, it is 
exactly what the Supreme Court did in virtually all of the post-
Brown per curiam decisions invalidating "separate-but-equal" 
laws. Our commitment to the flexible standard requires that we 
consider the matter further. 
If the standard required that a very substantial public purpose 
appear on the face of the law itself, we concluded in the first in-
stance that this law would have failed because the statute in ques-
tion contained no such recitation. Yet, if that standard of judicial 
review were already well established and popularized at the time, 
we may expect that legislatures, advised of it, would explicitly state 
their purpose. Suppose, then, that this had been done. Is the law 
now constitutional, or is it unconstitutional? The question cannot 
be answered, of course, until we turn to see what the legislature said. 
Suppose, then, that the statute had required racially separated 
schools and had further provided that this requirement was enacted 
"in order to perpetuate white supremacy and to degrade black peo-
ple" -the purpose many declare was, in fact, at the root of all such 
laws.88 In that event, of course the law will fail. Indeed, the Justices 
in the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson declared that had such a 
purpose been established in that case, that law too would have 
failed: "every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and 
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promo-
tion for the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of 
a particular class."87 And they rejected the attack on the law in 
question as being insufficient because it rested on "the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority," rather than in proof that such a stigma 
was intended. 88 ' 
But given the established and popularized constitutional 
"standard" such legislation must meet-a well-connected substan-
" E.g., Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
17 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (emphasis added). 
11 /d. at 551 (emphasis added). See also Black, supra note 66; Cahn, Jurisprudence,1955 
Annual Survey of American Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 182 (1956); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 1954 
Annual Survey of American Law, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150, 153-54, 157-68 (1955); Pollak, Racial 
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 
24-31 (1959). 
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tial public good articulated on the face of the law-it is unrealistic 
to suppose that the legislature enacting this law would have so 
declared itself, regardless of its actual motives. At least it is safe to 
suppose that no other legislature, observing the fate of this legisla-
ture's bill, would repeat the original error. Suppose, then, the face 
of the law articulated the very different purpose that fully equal but 
racially separated schools were to be established "in order to assure 
a historically disadvantaged racial minority an equal opportunity to 
develop educational curricula and programs more responsive to 
their needs, free from domination in schools in which their children 
might otherwise be overwhelmed by a racial majority." The "public 
good" is surely impressive, the expression of social contrition is 
moving, and the linkage between the compelling purpose of this law 
and the means chosen to advance it seems suitably tight. Is the law 
now to be upheld? Presumably it is, unless one suspects that the 
recitation is a fraud-that the recitation is for the benefit of anchor-
ing its constitutionality, while the law is actually meant to perpetu-
ate white supremacy. 
One may suppose that if there is fraud here, it will easily be 
penetrated. But that assumption is remarkably cavalier. The Su-
preme Court has utilized "purpose" as one prop in its "test" in its 
administration of the religious establishment clause of the first 
amendment88-and since the inauguration of that test virtually no 
law has been held invalid for failure to meet the "purpose" part of 
the Court's own chosen test.70 Even when few have doubted that the 
legislation in question was the product of sectarian self-interest, 
which the reigning "test" declares to be an improper purpose under 
the first amendment, recitations emphasizing other effects-
"permitted" effects-have been taken as virtually conclusive in 
meeting the ostensible constitutional command that such laws 
•• U.S. CoNST. amend. I. The "test"wasenunciatedinSchoolDist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 222 (1963) ("[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is 
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative 
power as circumscribed by the Constitution.") (emphasis added). For an illustrative 
"application," see Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See also id. at 254-66 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause, 
79 YALE L.J. 111 (1969). Note also how the "purpose" part of the test was not applied in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and how mere legislative declaration of"purpose" 
effectively insulated statutes from meaningful review as to this part of the test in Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Committee 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672 (1971). See generally P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw OF CHURCH AND STATE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962). 
7° See discussion and cases cited note 69 supra. 
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have secular objectives as well as primary nonreligious effects. 
There is no reason to expect a different result here. 
In the previous section of this article, we noted that under the 
constitutional standard that seems to have emerged during the past 
quarter century,71 a law will not be sustained under any of the fol-
lowing three circumstances: 
(a) if it overtly utilizes race as an index for determining 
civil rights; 
(b) if it expressly encourages others to do so; or 
(c) if it tends to produce either of these effects and if the 
expectation of that tendency can be shown to account for the 
law's enactment even when the law, on its face, says nothing 
whatever about race. 
This judicial resolve to remove the race line from our public life has 
been the most credible and admirable position for the Court stead-
fastly to maintain, so far as we are under a Constitution and so far 
as that Constitution is what the judges say it is. But under the more 
flexible "test"-which allows allocation by race when certain cri-
teria are met-to strike down a statute it is not enough to show that 
the law itself explicitly treats the rights qf one person differently 
from those of any other by making race itself a sufficient reason for 
that difference. Rather, one must also "decide," even in every case 
arising in each of the above categories, two additional matters: 
(1) what kinds of public purposes are sufficiently com-
pelling to justify explicitly treating some people less well than 
others on racial grounds; and 
(2) who is to say (and on what basis) that a law, which 
on its face is nominally very well connected with a sufficient 
public purpose, making its purposive racial discrimination 
"justifiable" under (1), was indeed enacted solely to promote 
that objective rather than to enact some baser interest with 
which it is equally well connected? 
This is not, I think, a constitutional standard at all. It is, 
rather, a sieve-a sieve that encourages renewed race-based laws, 
racial discrimination, racial competition, racial spoils systems, and 
mere judicial sport. It is Plessy v. Ferguson all over again, in new 
and modish dress. In the revised Plessy case we have just been 
considering-facially rationalizing racially segregated schools for 
contrite, moral, and "minority-favoring" purposes-we have not yet 
71 See text and notes at notes 24-56 supra. 
798 The University of Chicago Law Review [46:775 
noticed anything about the geographic, demographic, or political 
context in which the law appeared. Are such considerations ger-
mane, or are they to be ignored? Most plainly they must be treated 
as highly germane, 72 for otherwise our "test" becomes a farce and 
some atrocious uses of the race line will be sustained by our 
courts-as I suppose we would agree would be the case if the school 
segregation statute, with its pious accompanying recitation, were 
the product of an all-white southern state legislature circa 1900. But 
as a different possibility, suppose that the law were not one from a 
state legislature at all, but rather one promulgated by a city board 
of education-in a predominantly black school district with a ma-
jority of the school board members themselves black? Is this, too, 
to make some difference? What difference shall it be?73 
If it could be shown that the purpose was not as declared, but 
was rather to "degrade" black people, the statute must fall. Sup-
pose, however, that it was a product of some of each purpose, so that 
some members of the state legislature supported it in fact and in 
good faith on the very grounds recited in the law, while others were 
pleased to go along because they simply wanted to separate black 
children from white children. Or, suppose that the "purpose" was 
nothing more sublime than the preoccupation of each legislator to 
retain his own elected position by voting for whatever measure 
seems most pleasing to the largest or most influential bloc of his 
constituents, some of :whom, both black and white, favor this law 
(albeit not necessarily for identical reasons), some of whom oppose 
it (albeit for differing reasons as well). 
All of these questions will recur, of course, even if it is not 
constitutionally required that the "substantial" or "compelling" 
public interest allegedly served by such race-line laws be recited on 
the face of the laws themselves. Indeed, assuming no such addi-
tional requirement, we may expect such recitations to appear any-
way, insofar as they may be regarded by the Court as prima facie 
evidence of the law's actual purpose.74 All this, and much more, 
awaits the Supreme Court once it leaves the lesson of the "great 
decisions" of the past twenty years and, indeed, the lesson not just 
of "contemporary" history, but of our whole history. 
7z C{. Ely, supra note 11, at 723 (arguing that majority discrimination against itself is 
per se legitimate). But see Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential 
Treatment of Racial Minorities, supra note 11, at 19-26. 
73 For one view, see Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRos. 
341, 360-63 (1975). 
74 Exactly as did happen once this type of test was pub~icized for the first amendment's 
establishment clause. See cases cited note 69 supra. 
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I have used in this particular exercise of flimflamming the Su-
preme Court variations on Plessy v. Ferguson. It is not necessary, 
however, to be so wholly hypothetical. An actual example was well 
provided last year in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke.15 The Regents' Supreme Court brief treated the case as 
though the use of race itself to establish separate and unequal ad-
mission standards at the Davis medical school were really not the 
issue. Rather, the issue was better to be seen as a revised, updated 
version of Plessy v. Ferguson: that it is not the use of race as a means 
of assigning students to different schools that is at issue, but the 
reason for making such assignments. Thus, the question as set forth 
in the Regents' brief in Bakke was framed in the following self-
congratulating and self-validating fashion: 
When only a small fraction of thousands of applicants can 
be admitted, does the Equal Protection Clause forbid a state 
university professional school from voluntarily seeking to coun-
teract effects of generations of pervasive discrimination against 
discrete and insular minorities by establishing a limited special 
admissions program that increases opportunities for well-
qualified members of such racial and ethnic minorities?78 
There was no impropriety in this framing of the question given the 
fact that even long after Plessy and notwithstanding Brown, dicta 
in Supreme Court decisions continued to encourage racial discrimi-
nation by government-that which might overcome a merely re-
buttable presumption of unconstitutionality by being well con-
nected with "compelling" public purposes.77 Indeed, the joint opin-
ion by Justice Brennan (writing for himself and for Justices White, 
Marshall and Blackmun) fulfilled those dicta in its treatment of the 
Bakke case itself. 
After acknowledging that the effect of the equal protection 
clause is at least to reverse the usual presumption of constitution-
75 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
71 Brief for Petitioner at 2. Four members of the Court (Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist & 
Stevens) found it unnecessary to consider this question. It was plain to them that the use of 
racially separate and unequal admissions standards was forbidden by Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); they therefore applied Title VI as forbidding 
any kind of racial discrimination and voted to affirm the California Supreme Court, which 
had held for Bakke on constitutional grounds, 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., joined by 
Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). Insofar as granting relief to Bakke was concerned, their votes were joined 
by that of Justice Powell. Id. at 271 (Powell, J.). 
77 For a discussion of how the presumption of unconstitutionality works in the analogous 
flrBt amendment context, see text at note 61 supra. 
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ality in instances where government presumed to regulate or to 
allocate by race, that joint opinion then went forward to explain how 
such actions might nonetheless be sustained. First, "an important 
and articulated purpose for its use must be shown."78 "In addition," 
the opinion continued, "any statute must be stricken that stigma-
tizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the 
political process to bear the brunt of a· benign program. " 79 If both 
of these "standards" are ni.et-as they were met according to these 
four Justices in Bakke-then even separate and unequal ways of 
treating people by race are wholly constitutional. Given this kind 
of invitation to "accentuate the positive" benefits ofracial discrimi-
nation, the Regents' attorneys would have been professionally dere-
lict not to have rushed right in. 
Yet there are obvious difficulties with the revised proposed 
"test." If a 16% additional80 racial set-aside can be provided because 
it "counteracts" effects of "discrimination" by increasing 
"opportunities" for "well-qualified members of such racial and eth-
nic minorities," there is no reason to think that the good to be 
accomplished is less impressive or that the connection with the plan 
would be less snug though the additional set-aside were 20%, 50%, 
60%, or whatever; neither should it make any difference whether it 
were keyed to California population statistics, local population sta-
tistics, national population statistics, or world population statistics. 
If the ends are sufficient and the means well connected, moreover, 
surely it ought make no difference that the plan was adopted by a 
predominantly black city council-approving a self-favoring race-
based additional set-aside for municipal employees-rather than 
adopted by a predominantly white medical faculty at a state univer-
sity.81 Insofar as the racial complexion of the government unit is seen 
as furnishing some probative evidence as to the "real" purpose of 
the plan, surely it would be objected that it is the worst sort of 
racism to suppose that a plan inaugurated by a predominantly 
black elected body is more suspect than an identical plan inaugu-
78 438 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). 
n Id. (emphasis added). AB to whether the Davis plan may have imposed such a stigma, 
see note 38 supra. 
30 Fourteen percent of the total regular admittees for the two years in which Bakke was 
rejected were of the minority groups favored additionally by the 16% racial set~aside. Se~ 
438 U.S. at 276 n.6 (Powell, J.). 
81 See also Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 451 F. Supp. 1207 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Detroit 
Police Officers ABs'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Ely, supra note 11. But 
see text at note 72 supra. 
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rated by a predominantly white one. Indeed, as we have already 
seen, there is no reason in any case to suppose that whatever the 
"recited" purpose of the plan may be, that such purpose bears any 
necessary correspondence at all to the dominant political factors 
actually accounting for its adoption. The Bakke case is itself quite 
sufficient to display all of these difficulties, with no need to do much 
more than to notice the facts and match them against the 
"requirements" of the joint opinion's test pursuant to which sepa-
rate and unequal standards are constitutionally approved for per-
sons identified by race. 
The plan involved in the Bakke case was approved by a pre-
dominantly white faculty. The "brunt" of the plan was borne by 
individuals like Allan Bakke-white applicants with reasonably 
good application portfolios, but not among the very best portfolios. 
White applicants with the very best portfolios would of course be 
unaffected by the plan, as the faculty perfectly well knew. 82 Were 
persons in Allan Bakke's position thus well represented in "the 
political process" that singled them out to bear the brunt of the 
program? Four Justices evidently believed they were, as their 
opinion says that that kind of representation must be present in 
order for such a plan to be upheld, even when the plan otherwise 
meets their proposed constitutional standards. But on what con-
ceivable basis could such an assumption be made? Just because 
Bakke was white-as were the majority of the medical school 
faculty? But the majority of the medical school faculty were 
themselves not likely to have been "representatives" of the Allan 
Bakkes, that is, reasonably good, but not among the best medical 
school applicants. If we should assume anything about that faculty 
-as the four Justices acted wholly upon unexamined assumptions 
of political and sociological stereotypes-we might more safely 
assume that the faculty "represented" not persons in Bakke's 
position at all but only outstanding students, persons who do espe-
cially well in academic life, who do equally well through medical 
school, and who are thus sufficiently outstanding to have been 
12 Insofar as the faculty withdrew 16 seats from the original freshman-class total of 100 
(reducing the number of openings to be filled by the regular admissions process to 84 and 
restricting eligibility for the 16 seats exclusively to disadvantaged nonwhites), the faculty 
certainly understood that applicants who would otherwise have been admitted pursuant to 
the regular admissions process but who would now be displaced would be white applicants 
with good-but not the best-portfolios. The "best" white applicants would be unaffected, 
as they would still be among the 84 best applicants within the regular admissions process. 
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granted academic appointments in a great university. We might 
also assume that their concerns are not likely to place them in 
natural empathy with an Allan Bakke in ·any other sense ei~ 
ther-that their interest, in a highly civil rights sensitive university 
campus and atmosphere, is to be counted as being "racially sensi~ 
tive" people. 
Given these very troubling facts, then those who bore the brunt 
of the Davis program were not only not well represented in the 
political process that singled them out for its burdens-they were, 
rather, among "those least well represented." Yet this, the opinion 
of the four Justices declared, would be sufficient reason, entirely by 
itself, to regard the plan as constitutionally defective. Still, they 
failed to do so. 
The plain point of all this will not, one trusts, be mistaken as 
an attack on the Davis medical school faculty. The point, rather, is 
that even as applied by those members of the·Court most beguiled 
by the Lorelei of "right" racial uses by government, their own pro~ 
posed standards of judicial supervision are not applied83 and, in any 
serious fashion, are manifestly incapable of any u~eful applications. 
These "standards" will, rather, quickly reduce themselves to empty 
recitations that serve only to put the Supreme Court's own endorse~ 
ment on new racial systems-many of which will doubtless be the 
spoils systems of pure racial politics-inviting persons again to 
"think racially," to "vote racially," and to band together in racial 
blocs as much from necessity as from any choice of their own. 
In brief, this is the "accordionlike quality" of a Constitution 
construed to permit racial discrimination "when those who hold the 
reins can come up with 'compelling' reasons to justify it," antici~ 
pated and rejected by Justice Douglas. 84 Most certainly there is no 
feasible way of forestalling such consequences under the porous 
"standard" now beckoning the Supreme Court to its third rite of 
passage. Rather, as Justice Jackson declared in another context, 
"[i]t seems trite but necessary to say that ... our Constitution 
was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings."85 
And the only secure way to do that is to abide by the "lesson of the 
great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contempo~ 
rary history ... : discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, im~ 
83 For a recent case extending Bakke's rationale to sustain discriminatory race and sex 
standards in the hiring, promotion, transfer, training, and work assignments of public em-
ployees, see Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
260 (1979). 
" DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
115 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
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moral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of demo-
cratic society. "88 
Ill. THE NExT TERM OF CoURT 
When Alexander Bickel expressed his point, insisting on what 
he described as the lesson of the great decisions, it was a most 
uncharacteristic utterance. To be sure, Bickel had clerked on the 
Court during Brow71: v. Board of Education and had published an 
extremely compelling article in defense of that decision.87 Yet, Alex-
ander Bickel was far better known as a scholarly exponent of judicial 
restraint, an advocate of judicial conservatism. Not for him were 
there many "fundamental" truths that the Supreme Court should 
apply. Rather, "balancing" was the usual best course for the Court, 
and the Court ought not lightly overturn the action of a legislature.88 
As this was so, a fair question is raised about Bickel's seeming 
inflexibility in the particular instance of explicitly racial laws. Quite 
plainly he did not think that to get "beyond" racism, it is useful or 
helpful first to undertake a new generation of racially discrimina-
tory laws.88 But apparently others believe that it is, and surely their 
beliefs are entitled to some weight. When their view is reflected in 
an act of government, moreover, ought it not be counted heavily in 
some "balance," deferred to unless manifestly irrational-or unless, 
though rational, somehow simply not relevant to the constitution-
ality of the practice? There is no obvious accounting for the excep-
tional rigor of Bickel's commitment to a firm, unwavering, single 
constitutional standard on this subject. There is, however, an ob-
vious practical reason why the usual virtues of judicial conservatism 
could be extremely ill-served by anything other than a yery consis-
tent, very firm position that leaves nothing to further misunderstan-
ding. 
We have had three hundred years of national experience to 
notice that whenever race has been an admissible criterion of gov-
ernmental action, its licitness left people in public office without 
shelter against the organized efforts of those who would demand 
that they have a duty to act on that licitness: that they carry the 
" A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 133. 
17 Bickel, supra note 7. 
" See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. BicKEL, 
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: 
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961}. 
11 For the contrary view, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 
(1978) (Blackmun, J., opinion of). 
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alleged "merits" of race into appropriate legislation. We are also not 
without example of the inevitable necessity, the instant such regula-
tion or allocation by race has been understood to be acceptable to 
the Supreme Court, for the Court ultimately to have to decide sev-
eral other things as well. Among the more obvious issues, as addi-
tional groups, people, agencies, and parties are inevitably drawn in, 
are these: which races, how much to each race, by what test is each 
of us to be assigned "our" race? When these things were proper-as 
they were before Brown v. Board of Education-it was enough to be 
the government-designated member of a given "race" by being one-
eighth of that "race." That, as the Supreme Court itself will recall, 
was the manner of imputing "race" to Mr. Plessy for the Plessy v. 
Ferguson experiments in racial designation and racial allocation. 90 
The odiousness of these issues will be no less should the Court now 
reopen this governmental license than it was some years ago. 
Should the government be upheld in its first unqualified efforts 
to revive its powers of regulation and allocation by race, in Fullilove 
v. Kreps, 81 before the Court for its con.sideration this fall, moreover, 
we may expect to be afflicted with this way of life for the balance 
of the century. Most certainly, once the Court admits the govern-
ment's basic practice, it will be without any defensible ground to 
halt that practice or to roll it back within our own lifetime. Neither 
can it, I think, find any way whatever to police the inevitable cyni-
cism and race politics explicit in our common future once the basic 
issue is decided, as evidently it shall be within a year. 
By a very casually adopted amendment added to a bill, 
"Congress" has provided for a 10% strictly racial set-aside for cer-
tain kinds of federal contracts, exempting firms with appropriate 
racial "certification" from competing with other firms, and guar-
anteeing the certified firms that they need only compete among 
themselves for this share of the national business. The constitu-
tional wisdom of sustaining this statute has been discussed almost 
•• Plessy was deemed to be "colored" (in the words of the state statute) for purposes of 
assigning him to a given car, although he was "of seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth 
African blood; ..• [and] the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him .... " 
163 U.S. at 538. The majority of the Court, once accepting the constitutionality of using the 
race line as a permissible way for legislatures to regulate and allocate, also recognized the 
sorts of decisions implicit in that determination: "The power to assign to a particular coach 
obviously implies the power to determine to which race the passenger belongs, as well as the 
power to determine who, under the laws of the particular State, is to be deemed a white, and 
who a colored person." Id. at 549. See also Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitution-
ality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, supra note 11, at 12-14. 
11 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979), briefly described in 
note 9 supra. 
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entirely at an abstract level of compensatory jurisprudence. It has 
virtually left out of account entirely the more pedestrian realities. 
Once these inevitable realities are considered, it may not be in our 
common interest to urge the Supreme Court once more to pontiusly 
pilot its way through proposed heaps of federal, state, and local 
racial spoils systems, conferring the noblesse oblige of racial shares 
on the wretchedly shaky foundations of racial politics-deferring to 
"good faith" efforts, differing as they will (and as they already do) 
as to how big a share (10%, 20%, 50%), what groups to qualify for 
their "share" (blacks, Hispanics, women, Indians, Orientals, 
Aleuts), who comes within each group (all Hispanics or merely 
those from certain places, all blacks, or merely those from families 
of less than $15,000 annual income). There is not the slightest dis-
respect in confronting these matters in these terms, moreover, as 
they are the government's own way of confronting them, its way 
of governing. I find it very difficult to accept that serious students 
of constitutional law and of American history would truly desire 
the Supreme Court to approve these structures of government. I 
think Bickel understood all of this perfectly well and that that may 
be why, on this subject, for once he went to fundamentals and to 
absolutes. 
The Washington Post of May 22, 1979, carries the following 
earnest report on the manner in which these matters run even now: 
A highly unusual and controversial proposal under consid-
eration by a city agency would eliminate a large number of 
local ethnic groups from eligibility for lucrative minority con-
tracts with the District of Columbia government. 
The proposal, by the staff of the Minority Business Oppor-
tunity Commission, would eliminate from minority status all 
Hispanics born in Europe and South and Central America, 
leaving only those Hispanics born in Mexico or Puerto Rico 
eligible for the contracts. 
The proposal also would eliminate from minority status 
persons born in Vietnam, India, China, Korea and Africa. 
Four major local Hispanic-owned companies have won a 
total of more than $20 million worth of the city's minority 
contracts in the last year. This represents 40 percent of the 
entire minority share of the local market. 
The recommendation requires the approval of the commis-
sion and Mayor Marion Barry. One commission member, Peter 
Taylor, said he supports the change. 
"Lots of people here are coming in with bags of money 
from Vietnam and other places and buying up corporations," 
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Taylor said. "They are ... killing the little guy." 
A commission staff member said the proposed shift in 
guidelines is part of an effort by the commission to increase the 
number of city contracts going to blacks and "disadvantaged 
minorities." 
"We just want to make sure that [blacks] who were sup-
posed to benefit get their fair share," the staff member said. 
A staff member who helped draft the proposed guidelines 
said individual companies owned by minority applicants will 
be considered on their merits" '[sic] whether or not [the com-
pany] was historically disadvantaged in the United States" 
before a final decision on certification is made. "" 
The proposed change· is not without precedent in federal 
minority programs. Congress recently dropped Asian Ameri-
cans from the federal Small Business Administration program 
for minority contracting. . 
"Oh, my God," one influential Hispanic leader with ties 
to the Barry administration said when informed of the staff 
proposal. "If Marion agrees to do something like that, then it's 
really going to be a political war between Hispanics and blacks, 
and that would be terrible." 
Carlos Rosario, acting director of the Office of Latino Af-
fairs for the District, said he was not familiar with the proposal. 
But, he said, "I don't see why if they have Spanish heritage 
why they should lose their [eligibility for minority contracts]. 
If they are born minorities, they should have the same breaks 
as others." · 
"I've been working in the District of Columbia for 20 
years," said Jose Rodrigues, who was born in Argentina and is 
co-owner of a ma]or Hispanic company that does minority 
business with the District. "To be Rodrigues or black is the 
same thing. If there is [a minority program] in this country 
for blacks, it should be for Spanish people." 
Rodrigues and his brother Francisco own Fort Myer Con-
struction Corp. in Arlington, which he said does more than $3 · 
million in minority business with the city. He said his business 
also does another $1.5 million in the regular competitive mar-
ket. 
Angel Roubin, who was born in Spain, said: "It appears to 
me that if the city take that position, they are trying to dis-
criminate against other minoriies [sic]." 
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In support of the proposed change, Col. Milton Carey, 
president of Associated Minority Contractors of America, a 
District-based national organization representing primarily 
black contractors, said: "There are Spanish who have cultur-
ally lived as white persons all their lives and in recent years 
found it profitable to consider themlselves [sic] minority to 
take advantage of business in the minority community. 
"They are bringing in superior resources to bear so they are 
more competitive in the sheltered market." 
The key question, Carey said, is, "Have you been cultur-
ally disadvantaged in the United States. Have you been forced 
to live in a cultural bag? If the answer is yes, I say welcome." 
The original guidelines are spelled out in a 1976 D.C. law 
that entitles local minorities to 25 percent of the city's con-
tracting dollars. The law stipulates that minorities must be 
certified as such by the commission. Once certified, minorities 
only compete with minority firms when bidding on District 
contracts. 
Commission staff members said the proposed changes in 
guidelines followed complaints by black contractors that many 
of those who were originally certified by the commission came 
from aristocratic classes of foreign countries. 
Another staff member said, "We were being besieged by 
applicants from all over the world and we had to do something 
about it. "82 
The fecundity of administrative regulation and of invidious 
choices, once race itself is reintroduced as an additional index of 
governmental action, are all present here in microcosm. The con-
crete example is the use of racially separate and racially unequal 
standards in the award of government contracts. It might just as 
well be racially separate and racially unequal employment stan-
dards, racially separate and racially unequal educational admis-
sions standards, racially separate and racially unequal voting rights, 
tax credits, or some other: each contingent on race, racial authentic-
ity to be ascertained and certified by government, with entirely 
earnest sorts of good faith controversy as to what one counts. 
And so what, in all good faith, shall we say about these 
matters? Should it indeed be enough that one was born (distin-
guishably) into a "minority" race, or must one's race also have been 
"historically disadvantaged" as well? Is it insufficient that one be 
12 Thompson, City Agency Weighs Restricting Some Ethnics' Minority Status, Wash. 
Post, May 22, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1 (insertions in original). 
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born of that race, however, unless people of that race were histori-
cally disadvantaged "in the United States" rather than merely in 
other places? If one qualifies by these standards, is he nonetheless 
to be disqualified from the reserved advantage of additional, ra-
cially designated shares if he is "Asian American," Vietnamese, 
Indian, Chinese, or Korean? Must one not merely be a certifiable 
member of one of the remaining "races," but also be born in the 
United States itself (so that being born in Mrica, being born in 
Latin America, or being born in Spain will not count)? Yet, though 
not born in the continental United States, if one is "Hispanic" and 
is also born either in Mexico or in Puerto Rico (but not otherwise), 
may one compete not only with "Anglos" but, aside from one's 
business derived froin that competition, have access to a special 
racial set-aside? In each instance, moreover, is the "appropriate" 
test of a company the determination of ownership of a majority of 
voting shares of the stock, or is it rather something else or some-
thing in addition (suppose the company is 51% "black" owned, 
yet the executives and majority of the employees are "white")? 
The necessity to make and to police fine distinctions is clear 
enough. The necessary consequences of encouraging racial compe-
tition and racial resentments are all quite manifest ("Oh, my God, 
... if [the mayor] agrees to ... that, then it's really going to be 
a political war between Hispanics and blacks"). 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly all who have urged the Supreme Court to readmit the 
legitimacy of race as an explicit basis of governmental regulation or 
allocation have done so with some reserve, some measure of diffid-
ence, hedged about that, in any event, it should only be for a time. 93 
But no means whatever have been forthcoming from this permissive 
jurisprudence to enable the Court, once it unlearns its own lesson 
of history, to avoid the resulting dilemma: either to attempt there-
after to superintend the products of the new learning with the con-
siderable risk of being overwhelmed by the need to make distinc-
tions so numerous and so rank as to find itself discredited, or to 
pronounce a benediction on the presumed rectitude of executive or 
administrative bodies, and the presumed superior capacity of legis-
lative bodies to determine these matters, and retire from the field 
for another generation. 
13 E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
opinion oO. 
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It has been very tritely observed that the Constitution is a 
"living" document. The observation is nearly always offered as a 
prelude for urging the Supreme Court to manipulate or disregard 
some rather unequivocal part of that document. In this instance, 
however, there is nothing in the Constitution that licenses the na-
tional government to establish racial shares, to legitimate measur-
ing the worth of people by their race, or to tender entitlements by 
race. Keeping faith with the lesson of the great decisions of the 
Supreme Court during the past three decades, moreover, requires no 
new, manipulative use· of any provision whatever. Quite the 
opposite is true: the novelty is in the explication of arguments to 
relicense governmental discrimination. The basic question before 
the Court is whether the Constitution shall again be "adjusted" to 
accommodate a new generation of racial spoils. 
There is, even as the District of Columbia program illustrates, 
very little agreement in measuring racial eligibility for those spoils. 
There being no serious prospect for such agreement, and the Consti-
tution itself providing no articulate basis for the Court simply to 
"declare" the proper eligibility, the natural expectation is that that 
racial eligibility will simply be the product of racial competition in 
the political process. 84 Incentives to make out cases of racial "mine" 
and "thine" are thus supplied, and doctrine is to be arranged in a 
fashion most calculated to stimulate race politics. 
Ironically, the basic suggestion to relicense racial discrimina-
tion by government is put forward not despite its intrinsic tendency 
to set race against race, but as a good, benign, and thoughtful way 
to get beyond racism. But "getting beyond" racism in this fashion, 
we have reason to believe, is as little likely to succeed as the now 
discredited idea that in order to "get beyond" organized govern-
ment, it is first indispensable to organize a virtual dictatorship that, 
once it extirpates the evils that made organized government neces-
sary, will itself just naturally wither away. We have not seen govern-
ments wither by the paradox of assigning them even greater power. 
We shall not now see racism disappear by employing its own ways 
of classifying people and of measuring their rights. 
Rather, one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a 
complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in 
one's own life-or in the life or practices of one's government-the 
differential treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that 
" See note 90 supra. See also the conclusions reached on the same subject in B. B11TKER, 
supra note 11, at 104. 
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is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in life, 
whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or 
to favor any more than another for being black or white or brown or 
red, is wrong. Let that be our fundamental law and we shall have a 
Constitution universally worth expounding. 
